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APPROVED FOR RELEASE (b)(1)
DATE: NOV 2004 (b)(3)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# Memorandum

# THE CRISIS
# USSR/CUBA

Information as of 0600

1 November 1962

PREPARED FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

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## CUBAN CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS

U Thant's preliminary report of his encounters with Fidel Castro on 30 and 31 October stressed his impression that Castro is furious over Soviet agreement to dismantle the missile bases and determined to do all in his power to prevent any inspection of Cuban territory either before or after removal.

Castro told U Thant there had been no Soviet-Cuban consultation before Khrushchev's letter to President Kennedy was released on 28 October. He acknowledged that the subsequent statement of Cuba's demands had been made to complicate the situation for the Soviets.

Soviet General Stazenko, identifying himself as commander of all Soviet military personnel in Cuba, told U Thant and his military adviser that Khrushchev's order to begin dismantling the bases had been received between 1300 and 1500 on Sunday, 28 October, and that dismantling began at 1700.

According to General Rikhye, Stazenko said that all missiles and major equipment items would be removed by Friday, when remaining "bits and pieces" would be "bulldozed." Crating and movement to ports would take some additional time. Stazenko expects to leave Cuba with the equipment.

There was no mention of the disposition of the Soviet BEAGLE jet bombers now in Cuba, but U Thant and Rikhye "had the impression" that these would also be evacuated.

The Soviet officer was described as showing little concern over the prospect of continued US aerial surveillance of the missile sites. Castro reportedly was very strongly opposed, even under UN auspices. The Cubans told Rikhye that they would resist any further violations of their air space and left the impression that they had analyzed the standard pattern of such reconnaissance flights. Rikhye was left uncertain as to which anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba were in Cuban hands as opposed to Soviet hands; he was certain that those weapons controlled by Cubans would definitely go into action against US overflights, but did not know whether those manned by Soviet personnel would also do so.

Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov told US negotiatior McCloy during the course of a one-hour meeting in New York on 31 October that all anti-aircraft weapons in Cuba, including the SAM sites, were in Cuban hands. There is ample evidence in clandestine reports, Cuban refugee accounts, [redacted] that the SAM sites are under exclusive Soviet control. Such evidence includes numerous independent reports of the systematic exclusion of Cubans from all SAM sites, [redacted]

Soviet leaders are showing concern that Castro's attempts to block an agreement could revive the danger of US military action and thwart Soviet efforts to salvage the USSR's position in Cuba. The immediate purpose of Mikoyan's urgent trip to Havana via New York is very probably to exert pressure on Castro so that an early agreement can be concluded. He is also probably under instructions to work out coordinated negotiating tactics with the Cuban government.

In his efforts to hasten Castro's cooperation, Mikoyan may make new offers of assistance. Several members of the delegation accompanying Mikoyan are Soviet economic and trade specialists. Khrushchev's 28 October letter made it clear that the USSR will not "absolve ourselves of responsibility for rendering assistance to the Cuban people."

Soviet propaganda supporting Castro's "just demands" stops short of suggesting that the USSR is demanding fulfillment of Castro's proposals, and Mikoyan almost certainly will not endorse Castro's insistence on the return of the Guantanamo naval base and termination of US economic sanctions.

He may, however, agree to support Castro's attempts to obtain US guarantees extending beyond President Kennedy's offer of assurances that the US will not invade Cuba. In an effort to end US support for the activities of Cuban exile groups, the USSR and Cuba may call for reciprocal pledges by the US, Cuba, and the latter's Western Hemisphere neighbors to respect each other's sovereignty and to refrain from interference in each other's internal affairs.

[redacted] suggests that the USSR had at that time dropped its earlier unwillingness to permit UN inspection prior to the completion of the dismantling and removal of the missiles in Cuba.

Kuznetsov had told U Thant prior to the latter's departure for Havana that the Soviet missiles were being dismantled and shipped out, and that when this process was completed, the USSR would report to the UN Security Council and propose that a UN team could conduct on-site verification. Yesterday, however, Moscow instructed its ambassador in Havana to inform U Thant before his return to New York that he and his associates would be permitted "to look at whatever they want to...in Cuba."

This apparent concession to US insistence on the necessity of inspection throughout the process of dismantling would seem to provide further evidence of Moscow's anxiety that Castro's obstructionist tactics may provoke the US to resort to military action to neutralize the missile sites. On the other hand, the USSR may feel it can afford to make this ostensible concession at no costs to Soviet interests and rely on Cuban rejection of any UN presence. U Thant's preliminary report does not indicate whether the Soviet Ambassador in Havana made any offer to let him make such an inspection.

Soviet propaganda continues to avoid linking the Cuban situation with the Berlin issue, and Moscow is evidently ordering its propagandists to play down traditional militant themes in its slogans for the 7 November anniversary of the revolution.

Peiping continues its criticism of Khrushchev's retreat. An article in the 1 November issue of the authoritative party journal Red Flag described UN involvement in Cuba as interference with the independence and sovereignty of Cuba. Red Flag also asserts that only by having unshakeable faith in the revolutionary fight "can one avoid being cowed" by US military pressure or "deceived" by its flowery words. The article describes the Chinese people as the "most loyal and most reliable" comrades of the Cubans.

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## THE SITUATION IN CUBA

Castro is expected to break Cuba's official silence on the outcome of the negotiations with U Thant in a major nation-wide radio-TV address this evening. He may be expected to reiterate both his demand that no inspection of Cuban territory be undertaken and his insistence that his five conditions--including the evacuation of the Guantanamo Naval Base--be met by the US before any non-invasion pledge is "satisfactory" to him. Cuban propaganda media continue to give heavy play to statements that Castro's five points are natural and necessary demands. Soviet endorsement of the demands as "just" has been seized upon and publicized by Cuba as evidence of the USSR's "vigorous support" of Cuba.

[redacted] personnel in Havana saw no evidence in a 30 October automobile trip from Havana to Mariel and back that Soviets were then dismantling their missile sites. There was no sign of the transportation of such equipment to port areas of Havana or Mariel; on the contrary, there was evidence of considerable Soviet activity including the movement of building materials for an unknown purpose.

Soviet General Igor Stazenko told General Rikhye that the UN information on Soviet missile installations in Cuba (provided to the UN by the US) was "about correct." He said that although none of the IRBMs were operational, "six or eight" MRBMs "had been" operational. Stazenko said there were about 5,000 Soviet military personnel and 3-5,000 Soviet civilian construction workers in Cuba, and gave the impression these would be evacuated along with the missile equipment. Rikhye appeared convinced of Stazenko's good faith.

[redacted]

## BLOC MILITARY STATUS

No significant changes have been noted during the past 24 hours in the disposition or readiness posture of the major Soviet and satellite military forces.

[redacted]

[redacted] report that transport aircraft have been noted landing at several secondary unoccupied airfields in the vicinity of the Berlin air corridors and other auxiliary airfields are being readied to receive aircraft. Such precautionary dispersal would be consistent with the general level of alert in forward areas.

[redacted]

## SOVIET BLOC SHIPPING TO CUBA

With the departure of the East German dry-cargo vessel THEODOR KOERNER from Stettin on 29 October, the number of Bloc vessels en route to Cuba has been increased to eleven. These consist of five Soviet tankers (LISICHANSK, MIR, KARL MARX, GROZNY, and VLADIMIR), four Soviet dry-cargo ships (BELOVODSK, E. PUGACHEV, MICHURINSK, CHERNYAKOVSK), and two satellite dry-cargo vessels (KLADNO and THEODOR KOERNER). Of these, the BELOVODSK, GROZNY and KLADNO, which arrived at the quarantine line several days ago, still have not proceeded beyond it.

The KARL MARX and MIR are expected to reach the quarantine line tonight.

The Czechoslovak dry-cargo vessel KLADNO left her position on the quarantine line yesterday, and rendezvoused at a position about 400 miles northeast with the East German passenger vessel VOELKERFREUNDSCHAFT, now en route from Cuba to Rostock, to transfer a sick KLADNO crewman.

The Soviet tanker TUKUMS, now refueling vessels of the Soviet fishing fleet in the North Atlantic, [redacted] Havana by no later than 10 November. The East German dry cargo vessel HEINRICH HEINE is scheduled to load in Stettin and depart for Cuba in the period 2-10 November.

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ANNEX

EVIDENCE ON POSSIBILITY CUBANS MAY BE MANNING SA-2 SAM SITES IN CUBA

1. Clandestine sources within Cuba, Cuban refugees arriving in Miami, [redacted] make it clear that the SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba have been assembled and are being manned exclusively by Soviet personnel.

2. The speed with which the SAM sites have become operational precludes any significant participation of Cuban personnel in the firing batteries, fire control elements, or support elements.

[redacted]

3. We have had many reports that Cuban personnel are excluded from SAM sites. Most reports suggest that the sole function of Cuban nationals is to provide security personnel and some support facilities.

4. For the Cubans to man these sites, it would at a minimum have been necessary to send a special cadre of officers and technicians to the USSR for several months for initial training and then return to Cuba to train Cuban troops. There is no evidence this has been done.

a. It is estimated that personnel for a SAM firing unit can be checked out and equipped at the Kapustin Yar SAM range in three or four weeks--but this time would require considerable advanced military training and classroom work. In toto, close to a year's training would be required.

b. There has been no SAM training facility located in Cuba, and we have no evidence to suggest the existence of a Cuban SAM training program which could have produced by now the personnel required to man the 24 SAM sites now identified in Cuba.

c. Each such site in the Soviet Union is believed to require about 250 men, about half in support and security roles which in the present instance could be filled by Cubans. Hence, the SAM system in Cuba could have as many as 3,000 to 6,000 Soviet troops.

5. It now appears that all Cuban SAM sites will all be using the most advanced model of the fire control radar associated with the widely deployed Soviet SAM systems.

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ANNEX

EVIDENCE ON CUBAN INSTRUCTIONS FOR DEMONSTRATIONS SABOTAGE OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA

1. There is evidence that the Castro regime has issued at least some instructions for anti-US demonstrations and sabotage operations as a result of US actions in the current Cuban crisis.

2. Our strongest evidence [redacted] from a transmitter somewhere near Havana, instructing unknown Latin American addressees to destroy "any kind of Yankee property." One day later saboteurs blew up four electrical substations of a US-owned oil operation in Venezuela.

[redacted]

4. According to a clandestine report, leaders of the Nicaraguan Communist Party met on 29 October to decide on a plan of action to support Cuba.

a. [redacted] two Nicaraguan Departmental Commanders ordered strict vigilance because "we have information that enemies of our government plan to sabotage and burn gasoline tanks of the different gasoline companies during unloading of the ships."

5. This past June, according to several clandestine reports, certain Soviet and Latin American Communists agreed to organize strikes and sabotage against any governments that supported the United States if counterrevolution broke out in Cuba or if Cuba were attacked. These plans reportedly call for violence against US citizens and property in Latin America.

6. Another clandestine report quotes a Guatemalan Communist as saying within the past week that "aggression" against Cuba will be the signal for sabotage of US firms and installations and attacks on US personnel.

7. Castro still has at his disposal five embassies--in Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, Mexico, and Uruguay--which could be used to pass instructions to area Communists. He also has the large Radio Havana facility which beams intensive propaganda at Latin America, and he operates the Prensa Latina press network abroad.

8. Castro himself has spoken publicly over Radio Havana only once since the start of the current Cuban crisis; he did not at that time call for any anti-US violence in other Latin American countries.